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.If American pragmatism has anything to offer literary and cultural studies today, what
might it be? Possible sources of answers to this ambiguous question surely include the
exemplary work of the literary and cultural critic Richard Poirier. Poirier ha's been
investigating the contributions of pragmatism to. American literary and cultural studies for
more than thirty years, beginning with A' World Elsewhere (~966) and The Perjorming Self
(1971) and, most recently and most explicitly, in The Renewal 0/Literature: Emersonian
Reflections (1987) and Poetry anti Pragmatism (1992).1 To Poirier pragmatism means
Emersonian pragmatism, a (so far) self-renewing tradition of literary and philosophical
achievement that runs from the master, Ralph'Waldo Emerson, to Thoreau, Dickinson~
William James, Robert Frost, Gertrude Stein and Wallace Stevens, to name only those
philosophers and poets on whom Poirier dweIls in bis two recent books; there are others in
addition.. All in this line practice versions of what Poirier calls "linguistic skepticism": "a
liberating and creative suspicion as to the dependability of words and syntax, especially as it
relates to matters of belief, including belief in the drift of one's own feelings and
impressions. "2 "Something there is that doesn't love a wall," Frost teaches us. From that
vague "Some.thing," nothing nameable, let alone anything cognizable, comes the poem
"Mending Wall" (P & P, 148-51). Linguistic skepticism is Poirier's intentionally vague term
for the stance of readers and writers toward words and. the world which brings about poetic
events like this one.
Up close, w~hich is how Poirier reads them, the poets and philosophers in this line
habitually exploit the liberatory power that they believe comes from linguistic instability, the
defming characteristic of language as they use it and write about it and, importantly, as they
hear it. For Poirier devotes much attention, especially in Poetry anti Pragmatism, the
densest but most astute of his books, to the illusion of immediacy created by the sounds of
words, to the primacy of the voice in literature. For Emersonian pragmatists, a poem is
sounds. Tone and connotation are far more vital, in life as in literature, than the
theoretician's meaning or meaning of meaning, whether fIXed or floating. Experience--the
writer's, the readers"s--comes before theory in literary study as in baseball; the physicist's
demonstration that the curve ball does not curve is baloney to any hitter. And as Poirier
says, whether there will be a fist fight usually depends on the tone of voice of the son of a
bitch who calls you a son of a bitch (P & P, 141-42).
Following Emerson and Whitman, both of whom held readers to strenuous standards
of engagement with poems, Poirier teaches and writes out of an expectation that the reader
has a lot of work to do. He offers as a useful starting point the thoroughly non-academic
question that is always already being asked anyway by the interested reader in the act of
reading: "What is it like to read this book?" (P & P, 182)3 This question exemplifies
linguistic skepticism In small just because each consequence of taking it seriously obviously
is indeterminate apriori. Poirier grounds his question in Emerson's claim, in the essay "The
Poet," that language is "the archives of hi~tory."4 To say that language is "the archives of
history," and, more important, to write or read poems or philosophy aso though one believed
it to be so, is to hear in our uses of words resonances with the paste Linguistic skepticism in
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the modest sense <?f "What is it like to read this book?" rather quickly discloses its historicist
aspect, however, simply because answers to this query shade over, at least in many acts of
reading, into "What was it like to be alive then and there?" To be attuned to the linguistic
resonances which are our· inheritance--as distinguished from monumentalizing that
inheritance, thereby making it fraudulent--is to read past texts as lived experience. The
archives of history then open up through an ironical reciprocal relationship between past and
present, "so [that] the ho~rs should be instructed by the ages, and the ages explained by the
hours," in Emerson's words.s
Dependable instability continuously remodeling itself as creative achievement may
appear to be only another pretty air-castle of theory, but in fact beneath this premise are
foundations that go down deep, indeed all the way down to the living matter of human
neurophysiology. The salvific instability of words and the fuzziness of concepts originate in
the organic instability of the human nervous system. Linguistic skepticism comes out of
Poirier's reading of William James, to whom Poirier is indebted for the form of his main
conception just as he is indebted to Eme~son for what used to be called inspiration. The
specifically Jamesian idea of the vague, the breakthrough reported by James in The Principles
0/ Psychology , serves Poirier as an explicit philosophical pretext for linguistic skepticism.
.The vague itself, however, along with The Pragmatic Test, gives James some interesting
trouble, echoes of which may be heard in Poirier's work. But before Poirier reaches the end
of Poetry anti Pragmatism he has rewritten James's Pragmatic Test as a practical application
of the vague to literary study. In what follows I track down the vague and examine the
trouble under two headings: The Vague Before Po4-ier and The Vague in Poirier.
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The Vague Before Poirier
Linguistic skepticism represents Poirier's transformation of the vague, the defming
characteristic of the stream of thought or consciousness in James's philosophy of mind (P &
P, ch. 3). The Jamesian vague originates as a property of matter known as plasticity: "the
possession ofa structure weak enough to yield to an influence, but strong enough not to yield
all at once. "6 The exceptional plasticity of nervous tissue is what makes possible the reflex.
arc or nerve path. Electrical currents flow from the sensory nerves into the hemispherical
cortex and, once in, flow out--traveling along existing paths or cutting new ones. Systems of
reflex paths constitute in the living brain the growing network of "concatenated discharges in
the nerve-centres." James calls such concatenated discharges habits (Principles, I: 108 [my
italics--D. M.]) "Nothing is easier than to imagine, " he adds, "how, when a current once
has traversed a path, it should traverse it more readily a second time," just as once an ankle
is sprained it is all the easier to sprain the same ankle again. Human habits, whether in
small neural networks or in large stretches of the cerebral cortex, are functional in that they
enable human beings to use their "nervous and muscular energy" efficiently. By the grace of
habit we do not have to think through each step once we have learned to walke "A glance at
the musical hieroglyphics, and the pianist's fmgers have rippled through a cataract of notes"
(Principles, I: 114). Automatic behavior frees us.
It is habits, taken in this materialist sense, that make it possible for the human
nervous system tO'overcome its own inherent weakness. The human nervous system is
defective. The basal ganglia and the cord ar~ stable in the sense that what they do is lock-
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step, predictable, 4eterminable, dependable. But the cerebral hemispheres are unstable, i. e.,
their "performances" are "indetenninate" and ·"unforeseeable" by comparison. This natural
defect in thenervous system is paradoxically its great strength, .for it alone makes possible
human beings' successful adaptation to the environment. "This very vagueness," James says,
referring to the indetenninateness of the higher brain functions, "constitutes their advantage."
The higher functions, in particular consciousness, introduce "a tendency [in the human being]
to do more things than he has ready-made arrangements for in his nerve-centres" (my italics-
-D. M.); habits help smooth the way by directing and concentrating conscious attention,
thereby preventing its being frittered away. Viewed under the aspect of habit, consciousness
reveals itself to be "a selecting agency . . . choosing one out of several of the materials so
presented to its notice, emphasiz~g and accentuating that and suppressing as far as possible
all the rest" (Principles, 1:139).
Selectivity and feIt interest thus give the human organism an evolutionary advantage
by generating dynamic equilibrium, but in itself the advantage amounts to no more than a
"happy-go-Iucky, hit-or-miss affair"; any particular nervous equilibrium could "as likely"
lead to "the crazy as the sanething at any given moment." So here arises the fIrst big
problem James must solve if his philosophy of mind is going to hold together: Can
consciousness encourage "those of its performances" which are good for the human being
and inhibit those which are not?7 If the answer is yes, James reasons, then truly
consciousness may be said to bear a teleological function. Standing in the way of a useful
test of this hypothesis are bogus styles of "darwinizing," which speak in oxymorons such as
"blind" or "purposeless struggle." Any talk of either "useful" or "hurtful" reactions on the
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part of the organis~, James observes, only betrays the presence of a "superadded
commenting intelligence" interested in the outcome. Considered physiologically, survival is
only "an hypothesis made by an onlooker about the future," not an inherent feature of "the
organs themselves," of organisms or of nature generally (Principles, I: 141). But James is
interested not in the idea of survival but in the possibility that teleological function can be
demonstrated empirically. So he proceeds with bis own hunch, citing weIl established
experimental data that show consciousness. to be "only intense when nerve processes are
hesitant," whereas "In rapid, automatic,habitual action it sinks to a minimum" (Principles,
I: 142). He concludes that only on the hypothesis that consciousness "have the teleological
function we suppose" are these data explicable. 8
James's metaphor of "The Stream of Thought" properly stresses the continuity or
seamlessness of human subjectivity. The personal character of subjectivity is·often noted in
commentaries on James: "It seems as if," he wrote, "the elementary psychic fact were not
thought or this thought'or that thought, but my thought, every thought being owned"
(Principles, 1:226). But because the personal character of consciousness is merely
idiosyncratic by defmition, it only weakly illuminates the vague. By contrast, the process
character of consci9usness brightly illuminates the vague precisely, in part, because it picks
out nothing idiosyncratic. To say ·that thought has a process character is to say that thought
is a continuum. Like other continua--e. g., motion and space--thought is not divisible into
parts. It therefore would not follow that, if thought be a continuum, in thinking of a distinct
image of a fIXed object (e. g. the face of Ken Starr) my thought of it is fIXed and defmite.
Thought and thoughts are not fIXed but fluid. This premise represents James's radical
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departure from all previous authority on the topic, which held various versions of the view
that "the only possible materials of consciousness are images of a perfectly defmite nature"
(Principles, 1:254). It is futile, James writes, to "seize ... a spinning top to catch its
motion," or to try "to turn up the gas quickly enough to see how .the darkness looks"
(Principles, 1:244).9 All such efforts, when applied to continua, only yield the infmite
regress of the Achilles paradox.
Qnly on the hypothesisthat thought has a process character can James account for
relations, which must be accounted for given that consciousness "does ·not appear to itself
chopped up in bits" (Principles, 1:239).
A silence may be broken by a thunder-clap, and we may be so stunned and confused
for a moment by the shock as to give no instant account to ourselves of what has
happened. But that very confusion is amental state that passes us straight over from
the silence to the sound. The transition from the thought of one object and the
thought of another is no more a break in the thought than a joint in the bamboo is a
break in the wood. It is apart of the consciousness as much as the joint is apart of
the bamboo (Principles, 1:240).
Moreover, though continuous, consciousness also is ever changing, and the changes it
exhibits are rhythmic'; subjectivity resembles "a bird's life . . .[,] made of an alteration of
flights and perchings" (Principles, 1:243). The rhythm of consciousness fmds expression in
the "rhythm of language ... , where"
every thought is expressed in a sentence, and every sentence closed by aperiod. The
resting-places are usually occupied by sensorial imaginations of some sort, whose
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peculiarity i~ that they can be held before the mind for an indefmite time, and
contemplated without changing; the places of flight are filled with thoughts of
relations, static or dynamic, that for the most part obtain between the matters
contemplated in the periods of comparative rest.
Let us call the resting-places the "substantive parts, " anti the places 0/jlight
the "transitive parts, " 0/ the stream 0/ thought. It then appears that the main end of
our thinking is at all times the attainment of spme other substantive part than the one
from which we have just been dislodged. And we may say that the main use of the
transitive parts is to lead us from one substantive conclusion to another (Principles,
1:243).
The difficulty, of course, consists in retrospectively· giving the "transitive parts" their due, so
demanding, by comparison, are the "substantive parts" on our attention. We tend to presume
that the "transitive parts" function only as means of gening to the "substantive parts," the
conclusion. James rejects this means-ends calculus as a violation of the process character of
thought, for if we were to relegate the "transitive parts" to the statusof mere means, there
could be no defense against chopping consciousness into bits. The old-time Associationist
psychology would then be back in business, and the Intellectualists in the field would
likewise have new work to do gluing the bits together to fashion transcendental signifieds and
signifiers. James the empiricist believes the evidence from within consciousness does not
support areturn to these old ways. Between the silence and the thunderthere is a difference
between two sensory experiences but not a "break in the mind" (Principles, 1:244).
"Transitive parts" are essential relations; therefore "we ought to say .a feeJing of anti, a
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feeling of iJ, a feeling of but, and a feeling of by, quite as readily as we say a feeling of blue
or a feeling of cold" (Principles, 1:245-46).
James calls all such states of the mind "Feelings of Tendency," or "the vague U for
short. The Jamesian vague is not only "an inarticulate feeling" (Principles, 1:252); it is a
feeling of inarticulateness. James welcomes such feelings into the home of introspective
psychology, from which they have been barred apriori up to now. He welcomes
"namelessness" (Principles, 1:251), along with "psychic overtone[s], suffusion, ... !ringe"
(Principles, 1:258). "[L]arge tracts of human speech" lack Cartesian clarity and distinctness
and "are nothing but signs 0/ direction in thought, 'of which direction we nevertheless have
anacutely discriminative sense, though no defInite sensorial image plays any part in it
whatsoever" (Principles, 1:252-53). Though only "halting-places" in thought are
"intrinsically important," "[t]hroughout the rest of the stream, the feelings of relation are
everything, and the terms related almost naught" (Principles, 1:269).10
The vague analyzed by James in The Principles 0/ Psychology, his first masterpiece,
reappears in his second, The Varieties 0/ Religious Experience, published twelve years later
in 1902. In The Varieties James reports on the recent discovery by psychologists, himself
included, of the "the field of consciousness," the new view that he rightly says was rapidly
supplanting the old vision of the mind as a repository of sensations and ideas faithfully
dedicated only to cognition. In Pragmatism, published five years later in 1907, the vague
reappears again, this time as a source of trouble for James. I will conclude my remarks
about the vague before Poirier by briefly reconsidering the description of The Pragmatic
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Method, whieh JaI11es offers, as everyone knows, as the Pragmatie Movement's eure-all for
the ehronie ills of philosophy.
Every reader of Pragmatism will reeall the story James' teIls of the "feroeious
metaphysieal dispute" over the respeetive movements of the man and the squirrel. There was
a live squirrel supposed to be elinging to one' side of a tree-trunk; while over against
the tree's opposite side a human being was imagined to stand. This human witness
tries to get sight of the squirrel by moving rapidly round the tree, but no matter how
fast he goes, the squirrel moves as fast in the opposite direetion, and always keeps the
tree between himself and the man, so that never a glimpse of him is eaught. The
resultant metaphysieal problem now is this: Does the man go round the squi"el or
not?12
James offers the pragmatie resolution of this dispute: Everything tums on what the respeetive
parties "practically mean by 'going round'." Clarify terms, and if the clarification shows the
disputants that their dispute bad been about nothing, then Poof! So far, so good.
What interests me is how James manages to muck up bis exposition of the principle
that the example of the man and the squirrel--and other examples, non-trivial ones, sueh as
the One and Many--is meant to illustrate. What interests me is the form and eontent of the
codifieation known as The Pragmatic Method. The mucking up is not, to be sure,
earthshaking,' only annoying. Here is James on The Pragmatie Method:
The pragmatic method is primarily a method of settl~gmetaphysical disputes that
otherwise might be interminable. Is the world one or many?--fated or free?--material
or spiritual?--here are notions either of which may or may not hold good of the
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world; and 9isputes over such notions are unending. The pragmatic method in such
cases is to try to interpret each notion by tracing its respective practical consequences.
What difference would it practically make to anyone if this notion rather than that
notion were true? If no practical difference whatever can be traced, then the
alternatives mean practically the same thing, and all dispute is idle (Pragmatism, 28).
All James has to do to make this exposition of The Pragmatic Method hold up is to erase the
clause that says "the alternatives mean practically the same thing." But he leaves it in, and
repeats the sense of it later. The consequence is mildly unfortunate.
James wants us to believe that the absence of any practical difference to anyone
between notion A's being true and riyal notion B's being true shows that notion A and notion
B are the same notion. What is that notion? If I say the world is One and you say it is
Many, and if analysis discloses no practical difference to anyone between taking my view as
true and taking your view as true, then my view and your view are really the same view,
according to James. What is this same view, this sameness of meaning such that the dispute
in which· you and I had been engaged before it was analyzed by applying The Pragmatic
Method to it--the pre-analytic dispute, as it were--is now "idie"? I want to see it in writing.
When a dispute gets resolved after the manner of the one about the squirrel and the
man, or, more generally, in accord with James's own exposition of The Pragmatic Method
minus the offending clause at the end, it is revealed to have been chimerical. The disputants
believed they were at loggerheads, but they [md they were wrong. The upshot is that the
dispute is revealed to have been empty, not that a new, commonly held meaning emerges. It
is pointless to baptize the original riyal notions as "the same notion. " There simply is no
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· such notion. Agaiq, what is the same thing that riyal notions mean? What could it be?
When James put an end to the titanic struggle over the squirrel and the man he did so simply
by showing the disputants that they had been all het up over nothing--specifically the nothing
that the two sides had put into words. No "same thing that they meant" ever showed up.
No distinction without a difference is the watchword of pragmatism. No sameness with a
distinction might be a corollary.
When James turns next to the example of Ostwald, the Leipzig chemist whom he
admires for his pragmatism, he shows Ostwald taking better care of the language needed to
fonnulate The Pragmatic Method than he, James, does. Ostwald says that when no
difference in the world can be traced to this versus that alternative account of the same
phenomenon, then the very idea of alternative in such an instance· is senseless (Pragmatism,
29). Billed as rivals, such alternatives disclose no rivalry. But James has to put it this way:
"That is, the riyal views mean practically the same thing, and meaning, other than practical,
there is for us none" (Pragmatism, 29) No, they do not mean the same thinge If they do,
what is it? James never answers this question.
The Vague in Poirier
Poirier ignores James's painstaking derivation of the vague from its lowly origins in
neurophysiology, taking from James only the fmal fonnulation of the vague and refashioning
it as aversion of the unfmished loose aesthetic he calls linguistic skepticism. The
"reinstatement of the vague to its proper place in OUf mental life"--James's avowed purpose
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in The Principles--pecomes, in Poirier's hands, the reinstatement of tone, connotation, voice
in literary study, along with an implied challenge to what Charles Newman calls the "new
Germany of theory," contemporary American academia. This aesthetic, Poirier holds, is
grounded in the natural deconstructive tendencies in language. Between everyday language
and literary language Poirier fmds differences in degree, not in kind--in that way defming a
difference in kind and not in degree on this question between himself and such big-time
deconstructors as Paul de Man. "Figuration, rhythm, rhyme and meter," all sources of
vagueness in poetry, also generate useful vagueness in everyday language (P & P, 140).
Poirier believes literary study would probably be better off if it rid itself of "the illusion that
language is meant to clean up the messes of life," and rid itself, too, of the correlative
illusion that the 'failure of language to clean things up justifies a massive theoretical therapy.
Instead, "we ought to be grateful to language· ... for making life messier than ever, more
blurred than we pretend we want it to be, but also therefore more malleable" (P & P, 30).
The Gettysburg Address cleaned up nothing; the gestures of its language defer to the certainty
of grief and IOSS.13
Writers and readers in the line of Emersonian pragmatism "are at once .grateful to the
inheritance of language and suspicious of it, congenitally uncertain as to the meaning of
words and correspondingly attentive to nuance. Theirs is a criticism persuaded always of the
instability of any formation of language" (P & P, 178). This style of criticism gathers
philosophical authority from James's discovery that the substantive parts of the stream of
thought are continuously being eroded in the transitive flow, as the rhythms of language and
speech body forth the· rhythms of consciousness. Certainty is an illusion continuously being
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wrecked by linguistjc instability. This power to destroy is discriminable through study of its
consequences, vize the tropic history of Emersonian pragmatism. But a study of James's
Principles 'reminds us of the close proximity of this history of literary and philosophical
achievement tothe frailty, the profound defect, within the central nervous system. If no
defect, then no vague and no history--Emersonian pragmatist or any other. Along with the
vague, Poirier would like to see literature itself reinstated in literary study: he would'like to
get back some of the land ceded to the Glendowers of theory (P & P, 192). He would like a
, .
renewal of literature. Amen to that. Surely he would also welcome, if for different reasons,
areversal of what Newman calls the "temporary abandonment of traditional American
aesthetic pragmatism," a central feature of the so-called post-modem aura. A break in that
hyped-up weather might also allow us to see that meaning ·in art and life never was endlessly
deferred but rather always was historically referred or contextualized. We might then be
able to stop "wonder[ing] how our common sense was beaten out of us. "14
Poirier uses the idea of the vague itself as an alibi for James's own occasional
vagueness and seeks to dignify James's "blurring and vagueness" as evidence that Jamesian
pragmatism amounts to a poetic theory that offers "a prescription and a promise only for the
writing of poetry and prose. " 1 do not agree. It is true but not especially interesting in itself
that in the writings of James are to be found "dizzying metaphors." More interesting, in my
view, is the trouble ·James gets into using literal language, especially at those times when he
makes a grab for fonnula at the expense of his co~istently fresh and instructive concrete
examples. These are rarely blurred or vague in James, thankfully. James is best
remembered, in my view, for his mostly faithful adherence to his fIrst intuition as an
14
empiricist, namely" bis belief that experience comes before reasoning both in the order of
value and in the order of his own rhetoric. Nothing 1s gained by saying that at those times
when he lapsed, he tumed into a literary theorist. Similarly, though Poirier rebuts the
ignorant charge that pragmatism amounts to a pbil080phy of crude practicality and the cash
nexus, he strains needlessly when he says that Jamesian pragmatism has little to do with
practicality. It has a good deal to do with practicality. Pragmatism is nothing if not a
philosophy of experience, which is exactly what James always meant by practicality.
Experience is the recurring theme throughout James's scientific and philosophical writings
and, I should add, the strongest link: to both Emerson and Dewey.
I will close with Poirier at what I take to be his best: viz., in his troping of James's
Pragmatic Method. When Poirier concludes ~s book Poetry anti Pragmatism with a chapter
on bis work as a teacher called "Reading Pragmatically: The Example 0/ Hum 6," what he is .
doing, I believe, is in effect rewriting James's Pragmatic Method as a heuristics for reading
weIl. Reading what is there in front of us will get us as close as we can get via literature to
how it is in the world. Forget .subversiveness. Look and listen. Poirier offers no formula,
certainly no how-to, no theory worthy of the name in his account of what it was like to teach
Hum 6 at Harvard in the 50s, what it was like to have a part in training students to think by
training them to pay attention to the actions of words. "Philosophy lives in words," James
wrote in The' Varieties 0/ Religious Experience, "but truth and fact weIl up into our lives in
ways that exceed verbal formulation"15 Like his teaching, Poirier's literary and cultural
criticism brilliantlydevelops and prolongs the dis-ease identi~ed here by J3mes. What James
seems to miss Poirier retrieves: viz., that the welling up of truth and fact in our lives would
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remain a voiceless ~elling up in literature no less than in our lives outside it if skepticism
about language and logic were not habitually checked against experience. The willing
suspension of disbelief, after all, is not like fate but is instead adecision that the reader
makes and sustains. James, with'bisPragmatic Method, tried to make uses of words answer
to experience, thereby banishing phony disputes, but the rhetoric of bis fonnula pinches.
Poirier is looser from the start and consequently better at making experience, including above
all the reader's experience, answer to language when he goes over the head of James and
back to Emerson, not to lean on authoritY but in search of a heuristics of reading. What he
comes up with, of course, are bis own words, not Emerson's: Reading, Poirier says, should
be "a test of your adequacies and mine" (P & P,. 8).
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lRichard Poirier, A World Elsewhere: The Place of Style in American Literature
(London: Oxford UP, 1966); The Performing Self: Compositions and Decompositions in the
Languages of Everyday Life (New York: Oxford UP, 1971); The Renewal ofLiterature:
Emersonian Reflections (New York: Random House, 1987); Poetry and Pragmatism
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1992).
2Poetry and Pragmatism, p. 5. Subsequent references to this book appear in
parentheses in the text.
3Poirier's question is thoroughly non-academic, despite its career among students and
professors, simply because it arises from ordinary and untutored experiences of readers
reading, not ~rom what Charles Newman aptly characterizes as "the longest, ongoing
pedagogic literary conversation amongst the largest number of people, in the history of
mankind." Referring to the American academic literary scene from the 1960s to the mid-
1980s, Newritan writes: "No constraints of space, time, deadline or standards can be said to
have obtruded upon this process, and 'we can hardly claim that it has produced an increase of
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'fearless and disint~rested discussion' [presumably an allusion to Virginia Woolf]. This is
one failure !bat cannot be laid at the door of commercialism or mass culture. What we have
witnessed, epitomized by this never ending ecumenical conversation for credit, is the double
irony of an institutionalized respect far literature which disguises a diminished interest,
except as transactional therapy and careerist certification. The social context and unspoken
contracts of literary discourse have been modified to an extent that Woolf could not imagine;
these terms are now moot" (Charles Newman, The Post-Modem Aura: The Act 0/Fiction in
an Age 0/ Inflation (Evanston, 111.: Northwestem UP, 1985), pp. 114-15). In the thirteen
years since Newman wrote these words the institutionalized respect for literature appears to
have diminished, whereas the prestige of many kinds of theory in the human sciences has
, become so inflated as to make Newman's critique seem quaint. As theory rises, professorial
interest in literature declines.
4Ralph Waldo Emerson: Essays anti Lectures, ed. Joel Porte (New York: Library ~f
America, 1983), p. 457.
5"History," in Essays anti Lectures, p. 237.
6William James, The Principles 0/ Psychology (n. p.: bover, 1950; authorized,
unabridged edition), I: 105. Subsequent references to this work appear in parentheses -in the
text. James uses the terms "consciousness," "thought," and "subjective life"
interchangeably. SeeThe Principles, 1:224 and 239.
18
71n other w<?rds, "Can consciousness increase its efficiency by loading its dice?"
(Principles, 1:140). A century later, lan Hacking sees the philosophy of Chafles Sanders
Peirce, James's friend, as predicated on the existence of "absolute chance in the universe. "
Peirce thought history showed that "blind Chance stabilizes into approximate Law." See lan
Hacking, The Taming 0/ Chance (Cambridge, England: Cambridge UP, 1990), p. 215. Like
Peirce, James believed that chance phenomena (specifically the phenomena of human
subjectivity), though indeed absolute, nevertheless exhibit telos when examined functionally.
8Moreover, data having to do with "the causal efficacy of pleasures and pains"
support the same conclusion, viz., that "pleasures are g~nerally associated with benejicial,
pains with detrimental, experiences" (Principles, I: 143). Lest we fail to appreciate the
significance of this seemingly obvious remark, we should remember that in making it James
was refuting the standard "darwinian" account advanced by Herbert Spencer that natural
selection, rather than a "pre-established harmony" between organism and environment, is
responsible for killing off any creature "to whom the fundamentally noxious experience"--
say, of "suffocation, privation of food, drink and sleep ... [,] wounds, bums, the effects of
'poison," and so forth~-seemed enjoyable. James rejects this account. He believes pleasures
and pains are efficacious, not merely thecoincidental outcomes of the action of natural
selectioD.
The human nervous system, too complicated to regulate itself, is fortunately the
physiological site of consciousness: that function of supplying exactly the missing regulation.
J~es's general conclusion clarifies the apparent contradiction here:
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Apriori ana!ysis of both brain-action and conscious action shows US that if the latter
were efficacious it could, by its selective emphasis, make amends for the
indeterminateness of the former; whilst the study aposteriori of the distribution of
consciousness [as illustrated in the foregoing discussion of pleasures and pains] shows
it to be exactly such as we might expect in an organ [sic] added for the sake of
steering a nervous system grown too complex to regulate itself (Principles, I: 144).
Two brief remarks. One, James does not purport to show in The Principles 01 Psychology
that the brain and the mind are one. He seems content to await future discoveries in
neurop\1ysiology, which today shares a common research program with cognitive studies.
Second, James is consistent throughout The Principles in treating consciousness as a
hypothesis to be applied abductively. He sometimes calls it an "organ," often a "function,"
but always makes plain that some nonentity there is which purposely regulates a nerVous
system "grown too complex to regulate itself. "
9'fhe "re-instatement of the vague to its proper place in our mentalIife" represents the
sine qua non of James's analysis of consciousness, which in turn stands as the ruling
principle of continuity enumerated among the many other principles of psychology. "The
traditional psychology," James notes, "talks like one who should say a river consists of
nothing but pailsful, spoonsful, quartpotsful, barrelsful, and other moulded forms of water.
Even were the pails and the pots actually standing in the stream, still between them the free
water would continue .to flow. It is just this free water. of consciousness that psychologists
resolutely overlook. Every defInite image in the mind is steeped and dyed in the free water
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that flows around· i~. With it goes the sense of its relations, near and remote, the dying echo
of whence it carne to us, the dawning sense of whither it is to lead" (Principles, 1:255).
lOJames's long introductory illustration of the vague is designed to show us clearly
what the vague is, to suggest the poverty of psychological nomenclature and indirectly to
dignify imprecision in language and speech.
Suppose [he begins] we try to recall a forgotten name. The state of our
consciousness is peculiar. There 'is a gap therein; but no mere gap. It is a gap that is
intensely active. A sort of wraith of the name is in it, beckoning us in a given
direction, making us at moments tingle with the sense of our closeness, and then
letting us sink back without the longed-for term. If. wrong names are proposed to us,
this singularly defmite gap acts immediately so as to negate them. They do not fit
into i~ mould. And the gap of one word does not feel like the gap of another, all
empty of content as both might seem necessarily to be when described as gaps. When
I vainly try to recall the name of Spalding, my consciousness is far removed from
what it is when I vainly try to recall the name of Bowles.
James pauses here to allow "some [hypothetical] ingenious persons" to ask,
"How can the' two consciousnesses be different when the terms which might make
them different are not there? All that is there, so long as the effort to recall is vain,
is the bare effort itself. How should that differ in the two cases? You are making it
seem to differ by prematurely filling it out with the different names, although these,
by the hypothesis, have not yet come. Stick to the two efforts as they are, without
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naming the~ after facts not yet existent, and you'll be quite unable to designate any
point in wbich they differ. "
To this seemingly sturdy objection, James replies,
Designate, trulyenough. We can only designate the difference by borrowing the
names of objects not yet in the mind. Which is to say that our psychological
vocabulary is wholly inadequate to name the differences that exist, even such strong
differences as these. There are innumerable consciousnesses of emptiness, no one of
wbich taken in itself has a name, 'but all different from each other. The ordinary way
is to assume that they are all emptinesses of consciousness, and so the same'state.
But the feeling of absence is toto coelo other than the absence of a feeling. It is an
intense feeling. The rhythm of a lost word may be there without a .sound to clothe it;
or the evanescent sense of something which is the initial vowel or consonant may
mock us fitfully, without growing more distinct. Every one must know the tantalizing
effect of the blank rhythm of some forgotten verse, restlessly dancing in one's mind,
striving to be filled out with words (Principles, 1:251-52).
James's concrete illustrations of the vague are compelling, in my view, but the logic on
wbich he depends in bis exposition of it escapes me. Consider again bis example of trying to
recall a forgotten nanie. James says that in the experience of trying to remember the name,
a gap appears in our consciousness wbich is tailor-made for the forgotten name, Spalding.
Mention of some other name--Bowles--leaves the Spalding gap empty as ever. But James
sayswe now have two gaps, one unfilled by Spalding and the other filled by Bowles. James
claims these are different consciousnesses. His hypothetical critic objects. James
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surprisingly agrees t or says he agrees, with the critic's point that we can only designate the
difference between the two feelings by illegitimately importing into the mind names not
originally allowed by the,hypothesis. But James is wrong to agree here; either he does not
understand the objection or he does not understand bis own hypothesis. The critic is righ~:
James should not be allowed to borrow names. James then surprisingly agrees to this point
as weIl and says that the fault lies with our impoverished psychological vocabulary,
specifically the absence of terms with which to designate existing differences in
consciousness. This reasoning, however', simply begs the question. James assumes the
existence of differences in consciousness which he is required to prove. Next, James tries to
salvage bis argument by saying that the feeling of absence is entirely different from the
absence of feeling. This is no doubt true but irrelevant. James concludes with another of his
altogether compelling illustrations of the vague. I conclude that James's illustrations make
this part of bis case for the vague much better than his reasoning does.
llWilliam James, The Varieties 0/ Religious Experience: A Study 0/ Human Nature,.
ed. Martin E. Marty (New York: Penguin Books, 1982 [1902]), pp. 231-33.
12pragmatism:' A New Name For Some Old Ways 0/ Thinking and The Meaning 0/
Truth: A Sequel to "Pragmatism", ed. A. J. Ayer (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1975
[1907]), p. 27. Subsequent references to this volume appear in parentheses in the text.
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13Here 1 p~aphrase and adapt, with an allusion to the criticism of R. P. Blackmur, a
remark of J. Robert Oppenheimer's on style:
"The problem of doing justice. to the implicit, the imponderable, and the unknown is
of course not unique to politics. It is always with us in science, and it is with us in the most
trivial of personal affairs, and it is one of the great problems- of writing and of all forms of
arte The means by which it is solved is sometimes called style. It is style which
complements affmnation with limitation and with humility; it is style which makes it possible
to act effectively, but not absolutely; it is style which, in the domain of foreign policy,
enables us to find a harmony between the· pursuit of ends essential to us and the regard for
the views, the sensibilities, the aspirations of those to whom the problem may appear in
another light; it is style which is the deference that action pays to uncertainty; it is above all
style through which power defers to reason."· This passage is from a 1948 speech titled "The
Open Mind," excerpted in The Limits 01Language, ed. Walker Gibson (New York: HilI and
Wang, 1962), pp. 50-51, the source 1 have used. See also R. P. Blackmur, Language as
Gesture (New York: Harcourt, Brace and ·Co., 1952).
14Newman, p. 13.
lsVarieties, p. 456.
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